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Abstract
People morally evaluate norm violations that occur at various distances from the self (e.g., a corrupt politician vs. a cheating
spouse). Yet, distance is rarely studied as a moderator of moral judgment processes. We focus on the influence of disgust on
moral judgments, as evidence here has remained inconclusive. Based on feelings as information theory and the notion that disgust
evolved as a pathogen avoidance mechanism, we argue that disgust influences moral judgment of psychologically distant (vs. near)
norm violations. Studies 1 and 3 show that trait disgust sensitivity (but not trait anger and fear) more strongly predicts moral
judgment of distant than near violations. Studies 2 and 4 show that incidental disgust affects moral judgment of distant (vs. near)
violations and that the moderating role of distance is mediated by involvement of others (vs. the self) in the evaluator’s con-
ceptualization of the violation.
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An intriguing finding that has emerged from moral psychology
research is that moral judgment may be influenced by the expe-
rience of disgust. Studies show that people who are chronically
predisposed to experience high (vs. low) disgust are more con-
demning of criminal activity (Jones & Fitness, 2008) and gay
marriage (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009). Other stud-
ies show that incidentally experienced disgust makes moral
judgment of unrelated norm violations more severe (e.g.,
Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011; Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, &
Cohen, 2009; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Wheatley
& Haidt, 2005). However, various studies failed to show that
disgust influences moral judgment (David & Olatunji, 2011;
Johnson et al., 2016; Ugazio, Lamm, & Singer, 2012; see
Landy & Goodwin, 2015, for a meta-analysis; see also Schnall,
Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2015).
To understand why disgust sometimes influences moral
judgment and sometimes not, it is useful to identify theoreti-
cally relevant moderator variables that determine when this
effect will materialize. Here, we identify psychological dis-
tance as a moderator of the effect of disgust on moral judg-
ment. Psychological distance refers to the extent to which
objects or events are present in the direct experience of real-
ity. Large (vs. small) psychological distance results when
objects or events are distant (vs. nearby) in space or time or
when objects or events are hypothetical (vs. real; Liberman,
Trope, & Stephan, 2007).
It has been theorized that disgust evolved as a pathogen
avoidance mechanism that, over the course of human evolu-
tion, also acquired the function to signal and avoid threats
to the social order (i.e., moral violations; Chapman &
Anderson, 2013; Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009; Rozin,
Haidt, & Fincher, 2009). We build on feelings as information
theory (FIT; Schwarz, 2012) to predict that disgust influences
moral judgment of psychologically distant rather than near
violations. FIT proposes that people rely on affective states
and specific emotions as a source of judgment because this
information is readily available and quickly actionable. This
is especially so when the informational value of affect is con-
sidered high and when other sources of information are lack-
ing or difficult to process.
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Research suggests that FIT is relevant to understand the
effect of disgust on moral judgment: Incidental disgust
affects moral judgment in particular among individuals who
fail to disengage attention from emotionally colored cogni-
tions (Van Dillen, van der Wal, & Van den Bos, 2012), who
do not differentiate incidental from integral emotional
experiences (Cameron, Payne, & Doris, 2013; Sato &
Sugiura, 2014), who attend strongly to their internal physi-
cal states (Schnall et al., 2008, Studies 2–3), or who are
sensitive specifically to the experience of disgust (Ong,
Mullette-Gillman, Kwok, & Lim, 2014).
To apply FIT to the role of psychological distance in the
effect of disgust on moral judgment, it is relevant to consider
the informational value of the experience of disgust. In ances-
tral environments, pathogen sources were more likely to be
psychologically distant than close. For instance, interaction
with psychologically close others (e.g., those belonging to
one’s family group) likely posed less risk of contagion than
interaction with psychologically distant others (e.g., strangers)
who may host novel pathogens to which one has no immunity
(Oaten et al., 2009; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000). In sup-
port of this, disgust inductors (e.g., feces) produce more nega-
tive responses when they originate from strangers than from
close others and the least negative responses when they origi-
nate from the self (Case, Repacholi, & Stevenson, 2006;
Stevenson & Repacholi, 2005). We suggest that this effect of
disgust generalizes to moral violations, such that disgust is
found more relevant to interpret violations committed by others
at large psychological distance (vs. close others or oneself).
We tested our prediction in four experiments. We operatio-
nalized disgust as trait disgust sensitivity (Studies 1 and 3) or
experimentally induced incidental disgust (Studies 2 and 4) and
manipulated participants’ psychological distance to the viola-
tion (large vs. small).
In Studies 1 and 3, we also tested if specifically disgust
but not two other negative moral emotions, that is, fear and
anger (DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000; Keltner,
Horberg, & Oveis, 2006), exercises its effect for distant
(vs. near) violations. In contrast to anger and fear, the infor-
mational value of disgust is arguably relevant specifically to
avoid psychologically distant threats. These tests establish
whether the informational value of disgust drives our effect
and not reliance on negative affect as a function of psycho-
logical distance more generally.
In Studies 2 and 4, we tested if the role of psychological dis-
tance in moderating the effect of disgust on moral judgment is
mediated by inclusion of others (vs. the self) in representations
of violations. Psychological distance produces various distinct
effects, for instance, altering the intensity of felt emotions and
abstractness of event construals (Williams, Stein, & Galguera,
2014). Focusing on the representation of others (vs. the self) in
the transgression specifies the role of psychological distance
toward the dimension that should drive its effects according
to pathogen avoidance theory on disgust.
Scholars disagree about whether disgust primarily affects
judgment of violations of purity norms or generalizes beyond
that domain. Purity norms protect the sacredness of the body
and soul, such as sexual behaviors and taboo foods and are
therefore arguably directly relevant to the function of disgust
as pathogen avoidance. The nonpurity domain includes other
things considered moral, such as harming others and cheating.
We do not offer predictions one way or the other; yet, these
design choices facilitate connecting our findings with the major
streams of work investigating the effect of disgust on moral
judgment (see Landy & Goodwin, 2015; Oaten et al., 2009;
Tybur, Lieberman, Kurzban, & DeScioli, 2013, for overviews).
Figure 1 represents our model.
Study 1
Method
Design, Participants, and Procedure
We assessed trait disgust sensitivity and manipulated psycholo-
gical distance (large vs. small). Detecting an effect the size of
that in other research identifying moderators of the effect of
disgust on moral judgment (i.e., Schnall et al., 2008, Study 3,
Z2 ¼ .07; Disgust  Private Body Consciousness), with a ¼
.05 and power ¼ .95, required at least 156 participants. We
therefore invited 200 adult participants from Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk (AMT) and paid them US$0.85. Before the study
commenced, we employed Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davi-
dendko’s (2009) instructional manipulation check. Participants
who failed this check were sent to the end of the study and did
not end up in our data (as were participants who did not finish
the study). At the end of the study, we employed a transitivity
check (Nagel & Waldmann, 2013). Specifically, we asked:
“Imagine three people, Victor, Pete, and Adam. Suppose Victor
is older than Pete, and Pete is older than Adam. Who is the
youngest among the three?” We excluded participants who
failed the transitivity check from analyses, leaving an N of
161 (Mage ¼ 33.12, SD ¼ 12.22, 61 females).
Measures
We measured trait disgust sensitivity with Olatunji, Haidt,
McKay, and David’s (2008) scale (e.g., “If I see someone
vomit, it makes me sick to my stomach”; 1 ¼ strongly
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Figure 1. Conceptual model.
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disagree (very untrue about me); 5 ¼ strongly agree (very
true about me)).
We measured trait anger with Spielberger’s (1996; e.g., “I
often find myself feeling angry”) and Lerner and Keltner’s
(2001) scale (e.g., “I get annoyed when my contributions are
not recognized”; 1 ¼ not at all true of me; 7 ¼ very true of
me). We averaged both scales into one trait-anger measure
(Lerner & Keltner, 2001).
We measured trait fear with Bernstein and Allen’s (1969)
Fear Survey Schedule-II (“How scared are you in the following
situations . . . ?” e.g., “ . . .Being criticized”; 1 ¼ not scared at
all; 7 ¼ terror).
We measured moral judgment with Lovett, Jordan, and Wilter-
muth’s (2012) instrument, which contains 4 subscales (Deception,
Harm, Laziness, and Violations of omission) that represent
nonpurity-related moral judgment (e.g., “Feigning an injury to col-
lect on insurance”) and 2 subscales (Bodily violations and Purity)
that represent purity-related moral judgment (e.g., “Drinking 10
beers at a party and vomiting several times” 1¼ not wrong at all,
a perfectly OK action; 7 ¼ very wrong; a very immoral action).
Psychological Distance
We assigned participants randomly to a condition in which
they imagined that the morally contentious situations hap-
pened either “very far from where you are now, like very long
ago, very far in the future, or in another country” (large dis-
tance) or “very close to where you are now, like yesterday,
tomorrow, or right in front of your nose” (small distance; see
Henderson, Wakslak, Fujita, & Rohrbach, 2011, for an over-
view of similar manipulations).
Manipulation Check
After having completed the moral evaluations, participants
indicated the distance between themselves and the described
situations (0 ¼ very near to me; yesterday, tomorrow, and/or
right in front of me; 100 ¼ very far from where I am now; long
ago, in the future, and/or in another country).
Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics, Cronbach’s a coeffi-
cients, and correlations.
Manipulation Check
ANOVA revealed that participants in the far condition ima-
gined situations to be further away (M ¼ 68.25, SD ¼ 30.41)
than participants in the close condition (M ¼ 31.00, SD ¼
30.00), F(1, 159) ¼ 61.14, p < .001, b ¼ 37.25, 95% CI
[27.84; 46.66], d ¼ 1.23, 95% CI [0.90, 1.57].
Hypotheses Testing
We used Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression. Table 2 pre-
sents the results.
Disgust SensitivityDistance significantly predicted nonpur-
ity- and, marginally, purity-related moral judgment (Figure 2).
Simple effect analyses showed a stronger disgust sensitivity effect
for distant than near nonpurity-related transgressions, b ¼ 1.04,
SE ¼ 0.20, t(160) ¼ 5.23, p < .001, 95% CI [0.65, 1.43], d ¼
.82, 95% CI [0.50, 1.15] versus b ¼ .32, t(160) ¼ 1.88, p = .06,
95% CI [0.02, 0.66], d ¼ .30, 95% CI [0.01, 0.61] and
purity-related transgressions, b ¼ 1.69, SE ¼ 0.30, t(160) ¼
5.68, p < .001, 95% CI [1.10, 2.27], d ¼ .90, 95% CI [0.57,
1.22] versus b ¼ .98, SE ¼ 0.26, t(160) ¼ 3.78, p < .001, 95%
CI [0.47, 1.48], d ¼ .60, 95% CI [0.28, 0.91].
To establish the exact shape of the Disgust  Distance
effect, we also probed the effect of distance contingent upon
disgust sensitivity. We used the Johnson-Neyman (1936) tech-
nique, which identifies for each value of the moderator whether
the predictor significantly predicts the criterion, thus avoiding
reliance on arbitrary moderator values such as 1 SD below and
above the mean (Bauer & Curran, 2005). We found a negative
effect (p < .05) of distance on nonpurity-related moral judg-
ment for disgust sensitivity values <2.27 and a positive effect
for values >3.42. Distance did not significantly affect purity-
related moral judgment for any value of disgust sensitivity.
Discussion of Study 1 and Introduction
to Study 2
In Study 1, disgust affected both distant (vs. close) nonpurity-
and purity-related moral judgment, although the effect appeared
to be stronger in the former case; we address this in the quanti-
tative integration of studies section. In Study 2, we focused on
the effect of incidental disgust on unrelated moral judgment.
In Study 2, we also tested if the moderating role of psycho-
logical distance is itself mediated by involvement of others (vs.
the self) in the conceptualization of the violation (Figure 1).
Specifically, before judging a near or distant transgression, par-
ticipants described it in their own words. We coded partici-
pants’ narratives with the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
(LIWC2015) software (Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Black-
burn, 2015). LIWC assigns each word and common word com-
bination to one or more linguistic categories. We focused
on the category assessing a focus on others versus the self
(Kacewicz, Pennebaker, Davis, Jeon, & Graesser, 2014).
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Study 1).
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5
1 Disgust sensitivity 2.96 0.55 (.86) .19** .38*** .47*** .35***
2 Dispositional anger 3.21 1.10 (.92) .41*** .13 .10
3 Dispositional fear 3.31 0.87 (.90) .37*** .40***
4 Purity-related
moral judgment
3.92 1.50 (.90) .76***
5 Nonpurity related
moral judgment
4.40 0.96 (.90)
Note. N ¼ 161. The diagonal lists Cronbach’s a coefficients.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Study 2
Method
Participants and Design
We expected tests involving the involvement of others (vs. the
self) in the transgression conceptualization to be relatively low
in statistical power. Therefore, we recruited 300 adults via
AMT (rather than 200, as in Study 1) and paid them
US$0.75. As in Study 1, participants who failed the instruc-
tional check were sent to the end of the study and did not end
up in our data (as were participants who did not finish the
study, N ¼ 27). We excluded 29 participants who did not
describe a physical disgust situation and 10 participants who
had missing values on one of the key variables, resulting in a
final N of 234 (121 men; Mage ¼ 36.64, SD ¼ 12.28). We did
Figure 2. How disgust sensitivity predicts moral judgment as a function of psychological distance in Study 1.
Table 2. Regression Results of Study 1.
Purity-Related Moral Judgment Nonpurity Related Moral Judgment
Predictor
Step 1 R2 ¼ .23*** Step 1 R2 ¼ .17***
b (SE) [95% CI b] t d [95% CI d] b (SE) [95% CI b] t d [95% CI d]
Constant 3.97 (0.11) [3.76, 4.18] 37.47*** 5.91 [5.19, 6.62] 4.44 (.07) [4.30, 4.58] 62.61*** 9.87 [8.75, 10.99]
Disgust 1.33 (0.20) [0.94, 1.71] 6.77*** 1.07 [0.74, 1.40] .68 (.13) [0.42, 0.94] 5.18*** 0.82 [0.50, 1.14]
Distance .001 (0.11) [0.21, 0.21] 0.01 0.002 [0.31, 0.31] .02 (.07) [0.12, 0.16] 0.34 0.05 [0.26, 0.36]
Disgust  Distance 0.36 (0.20) [0.03, 0.74] 1.81y 0.29 [0.03, 0.60] .36 (.13) [0.10, 0.62] 2.72*** 0.43 [0.12, 0.74]
Step 2 R2change ¼ .05* Step 2 R2change ¼ .07**
Constant 3.97 (0.10) [3.76, 4.17] 38.14*** 6.01 [5.29, 6.74] 4.44 (0.07) [4.30, 4.57] 64.68*** 10.20 [9.04, 11.35]
Disgust 1.15 (0.21) [0.73, 1.57] 5.38*** 0.85 [0.53, 1.17] 0.50 (0.14) [0.22, 0.78] 3.51*** 0.55 [0.24, 0.87]
Distance 0.001 (0.10) [0.20, 0.21] 0.01 0.002 [0.31, 0.31] 0.03 (0.07) [0.11, 0.16] 0.40 0.06 [0.25, 0.37]
Disgust  Distance 0.33 (0.21) [0.09, 0.75] 1.54 0.24 [0.07, 0.55] 0.29 (0.14) [0.01, 0.57] 2.07* 0.32 [0.02, 0.64]
Anger 0.04 (0.10) [0.25, 0.16] 0.40 0.06 [0.37, 0.25] 0.07 (0.07) [0.21, 0.06] .1.07 0.17 [0.48, 0.14]
Fear 0.38 (0.14) [0.10, 0.66] 2.68** 0.42 [0.11, 0.73] 0.35 (0.09) [0.17, 0.54] 3.78*** 0.60 [0.28, 0.91]
Anger  Distance 0.13 (0.10) [0.07, 0.34] 1.28 0.20 [0.11, 0.51] 0.02 (0.07) [0.11, 0.16] 0.32 0.05 [0.26, 0.36]
Fear  Distance 0.19 (0.14) [0.47, 0.10] 1.31 0.21 [0.52, 0.10] 0.05 (0.09) [0.23, 0.14] 0.52 0.08 [0.39, 0.23]
Note. Interactions are based on mean centered versions of disgust, anger, and fear and an effect coded version of distance (1¼ near, 1¼ distant). Table presents
unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors (in round brackets), 95% confidence intervals (CIs; in square brackets), t values, Cohen’s d, and its 95% CI
(in square brackets).
yp < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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not employ a transitivity check. We assigned participants ran-
domly to one condition in a 2 (disgust induction vs. control) 
2 (psychological distance: near vs. far) between-subjects fac-
torial design.
Procedure
We manipulated incidental disgust using Schnall et al.’s
(2008, Study 3) procedure. In the disgust condition, partici-
pants wrote about a specific event that happened to them
that involved seeing or touching something physically dis-
gusting. In the control condition, participants viewed a pic-
ture of a landscape, pretested to ensure it did not arouse
positive or negative emotion. After this, participants indi-
cated their disgust (3 items: disgusted, repulsed, grossed
out; 1 ¼ does not describe my feelings right now; 5 ¼
describes my feelings extremely well; Schnall et al., 2008).
Subsequently, we manipulated psychological distance as in
Study 1. We measured moral judgment with six transgres-
sion vignettes from Schnall et al. (2008, Studies 2–4; 1 ¼
perfectly ok; 9 ¼ extremely wrong): “Dog,” “plane crash,”
and “kitten” involve purity-related moral judgment;
“wallet,” “resume,” and “trolley” involve nonpurity-related
moral judgment. Participants described each transgression
in their own words before judging the violation. Finally,
participants responded to the distance check, provided
demographics, and were debriefed (Table 3).
Results
Manipulation Checks
ANOVA revealed that disgust was significantly higher in the
disgust (M ¼ 3.34, SD ¼ 1.13) than the control condition
(M ¼ 1.67, SD ¼ 1.20), F(1, 231) ¼ 104.84, p < .001,
d ¼ 1.37, 95% CI ¼ [1.07, 1.66].
ANOVA revealed a significant distance effect F(1, 224) ¼
27.45, p < .001, d¼ .70, 95% CI¼ [0.43, 0.97], on the distance
check, but no disgust, F(1, 224) ¼ 2.02, p ¼ .16, d ¼ .20, 95%
CI ¼ [0.06, 0.46], or Disgust  Distance effect, F(1, 224) ¼
.37, p ¼ .54, d ¼ .09, 95% CI ¼ [0.17, 0.35]. Participants in
the far condition considered the situations to be further away
(M ¼ 6.65, SD ¼ 2.17) than those in the close condition
(M ¼ 4.78, SD ¼ 2.93).1
Hypothesis Testing
We used OLS regression. Table 4 shows the results.
We first tested if psychological distance moderates the
effect of disgust on moral judgment. Disgust  Distance did
not significantly affect nonpurity-related moral judgment, but
it affected purity-related moral judgment (Figure 3). Simple
effect tests revealed that disgust did not affect purity-related
judgment in the near condition, b ¼ .28, SE ¼ 0.33, t(233)
¼ .83, p= .41, 95% CI [0.93, 0.38], d ¼ .11, 95% CI
[0.37, 0.15], but it did in the far condition, b ¼ .78, SE ¼
0.40, t(233) ¼ 1.96, p = .05, 95% CI [0.01, 1.56], d ¼ .26,
95% CI [0.00, 0.51].
To establish the exact shape of the Disgust  Distance
effect, we also probed the effect of distance contingent upon
disgust. There was no distance effect in the disgust condition,
b ¼ .46, SE ¼ 0.41, p ¼ .27, d ¼ .14, 95% CI [0.11, 0.40],
but a marginal effect in the control condition. Near (vs. dis-
tant) transgressions led to less severe purity-related moral
judgment, b ¼ .60, SE ¼ 0.31, p ¼ .06, d ¼ .25, 95% CI
¼ [0.51, 0.01].
We then tested if other (vs. self) focus mediates the moder-
ating role of psychological distance (Figure 1). For such a med-
iating role, other (vs. self) focus should be affected by distance.
OLS regression revealed that high (vs. low) distance leads to
stronger other (vs. self) focus for purity transgressions, b ¼
9.40, SE ¼ 3.74, t(233) ¼ 2.52, p ¼ .01, 95% CI [2.04,
16.77], d¼ .33, 95% CI [0.07, 0.59] but not for nonpurity trans-
gressions, b ¼ 4.24, SE¼ 2.69, t(233)¼ 1.57, p ¼ .12, 95% CI
[1.07, 9.54], d ¼ .21, 95% CI [0.05, 0.46].
We subsequently tested if other (vs. self) focus moderates
the effect of disgust on moral judgment (Table 4, Model 2).
We found a significant Disgust Other versus self focus effect
for purity-related moral judgment but not for nonpurity-related
moral judgment.
Johnson–Neyman analyses (Figure 4) revealed that disgust
(vs. control) led to more severe purity-related judgment
(p < .05) only for other (vs. self) focus values >84.75 (Figure 4).
Other versus self focus predicted purity-related moral
judgment in the control condition, b ¼ .02, SE ¼ 0.01,
t(233) ¼ 2.83, p = .01, 95% CI [0.03, 0.01], d ¼ .37,
95% CI [0.63, 0.11], but not in the disgust condition, b ¼
.004, SE ¼ 0.007, t(233) ¼ .59, p ¼ .56, 95% CI [0.01,
.02], d ¼ .08, 95% CI [0.18, 0.33].
As an overall test that other (vs. self) focus mediates psycho-
logical distance’s moderating role in the effect of disgust on
moral judgment (Figure 1), we fitted the complete model with
R (using the Lavaan package; Rosseel, 2012) to calculate a
bootstrapped (5,000 resamples) confidence interval (CI) of the
index of moderated mediation (index ¼ .17, 95% CI [0.03,
0.48]; d ¼ 0.20, 95% CI [0.05, 0.46]).
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Study 2).
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4
1 Others versus self
(purity)
57.47 28.53 .48*** .13* .10
2 Others versus self
(nonpurity)
43.48 20.37 .29*** .25***
3 Purity-related moral
judgment
7.21 1.89 (.68) .47***
4 Nonpurity related
moral judgment
6.24 1.75 (.51)
Note. N¼ 234. Higher scores on others versus self indicate a stronger focus on
others rather than the self in participants’ transgression narratives. The diago-
nal lists Cronbach’s a coefficients.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Discussion of Study 2 and Introduction to
Studies 3 and 4
In line with Study 1, Study 2 shows that incidental disgust
(vs. the control condition) affects moral judgment of distant
(vs. near) purity transgressions. The moderating role of psycho-
logical distance is mediated by a focus on others (vs. the self) in
representations of the violation. However, unlike Study 1,
Study 2 did not reveal a moderating role of distance for
nonpurity-related judgments. We return to this in the quantita-
tive integration of studies section.
Studies 3 and 4 were replications of Studies 1 and 2, respec-
tively. To determine the sample size we averaged the effect
sizes of Studies 1 and 2. Power analysis with an average effect
size d¼ .32, power¼ .95, and a¼ .05 yielded a minimum sam-
ple of 499. Based on Studies 1 and 2 we expected a drop-out of
20%. We also wanted to exclude participants who went through
the study too quickly to have taken it seriously. We therefore
invited 750 participants for each study.
Study 3
Method
Design, Participants, and Procedure
Of 750 AMT workers invited, 727 finished the study, thus pro-
viding us with their data. Of these, 49 failed the attention check
and 79 took insufficient time to go through the study, leaving
an N of 612 (there was some overlap between these two cri-
teria; Mage ¼ 39.82, SD ¼ 12.76, 301 females).2
Design and Measures
Study 3 was a replication of Study 1 with one difference: We
assessed the distance check on a 9-point scale (1 ¼ very close;
9 ¼ very far).
Results
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics, Cronbach’s a coeffi-
cients, and correlations.
Manipulation Check
ANOVA revealed that participants in the far condition ima-
gined situations to be further away (M ¼ 6.53, SD ¼ 2.33) than
participants in the close condition, M ¼ 4.35, SD ¼ 2.79;
F(1, 610) ¼ 110.31, p < .001, Z2 ¼ .15, b ¼ 1.09, 95% CI
[27.84, 46.66], d ¼ .26, 95% CI [0.10, 0.42].
Hypotheses Testing
We used OLS regression. Table 6 presents the results.
As in Study 1, Disgust Sensitivity Psychological Distance
significantly predicted nonpurity-related moral judgment, and
marginally, purity-related judgment (Figure 5). Simple slope
analyses showed a stronger effect of disgust sensitivity onT
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nonpurity-related judgment in the near than the distant condi-
tion, b ¼ .64, SE ¼ 0.08, t(611) ¼ 8.12, p < .001, 95% CI
[0.48, 0.79], d ¼ .66, 95% CI [0.49, 0.82] versus b ¼ .35,
SE ¼ 0.08, t(611) ¼ 4.51, p < .001, 95% CI [0.20, 0.50],
d¼ .37, 95% CI [0.21, 0.52]. The positive relationship between
disgust sensitivity and purity-related moral judgment did not
differ between the distance conditions.
Johnson-Neyman (1936) analyses revealed that distance
negatively affects (p < .05) nonpurity-related moral judgment
for disgust sensitivity values <2.94 and positively affects it for
values >4.72. Psychological distance positively affected purity-
related judgment regardless of the level of disgust sensitivity.
Study 4
Method
Participants and Design
Of 750 invited AMT workers, 720 finished the study, thus
providing us with their data. Of these, 66 wrote about an
event that was not physically disgusting, 24 took less than
the pre-set time limit of 320 s, and 42 failed the attention
check. There was some overlap between the two exclusion
criteria, leaving an N of 603 (291 females; Mage ¼ 37.84,
SD ¼ 11.56).
Figure 4. Regions of significance plots of the effect of disgust on moral judgment as moderated by other (vs. self) focus in Study 2. Grey zones
represent 95% confidence intervals for the effect of disgust as a function of other (vs. self) focus.
Figure 3. The effect of incidental disgust on moral judgment as moderated by psychological distance (Study 2). Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
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Procedure
Study 4 was a replication of Study 2.
Results
Table 7 presents descriptive statistics and correlations.
Manipulation Checks
ANOVA revealed that disgust was higher in the disgust
(M ¼ 3.25, SD ¼ 1.23) than in the control condition
(M ¼ 1.28, SD ¼ .72), F(1, 600)3 ¼ 592.59, p < .001,
d ¼ 2.00, 95% CI [1.80, 2.20].
ANOVA revealed a significant distance effect on the dis-
tance check, F(1, 599) ¼ 75.73, p < .001, d ¼ .70, 95% CI
[0.54, 0.86], but no significant disgust, F(1, 599) ¼ .02, p ¼
.88, d ¼ .00, 95% CI [0.16, 0.16]), or Disgust  Psychologi-
cal Distance effect, F(1, 599) ¼ .60, p ¼ .44, d ¼ .06, 95% CI
[0.10, 0.22]. Participants in the far condition considered the
situations to be further away (M ¼ 6.56, SD ¼ 2.43) than those
in the close condition (M ¼ 4.57, SD ¼ 3.02).
Hypothesis Testing
Table 8 presents the results.
We first tested if distance moderates the effect of disgust on
moral judgment. DisgustDistance did not significantly affect
nonpurity- or purity-related moral judgment (see Figure 6). We
nevertheless conducted simple effects tests to assess equiva-
lence with Study 2. High (vs. low) disgust led to more severe
purity-related judgment of distant transgressions, b ¼ .46, SE
¼ 0.46 t(602) ¼ 2.52, p = .01, 95% CI [0.10, 0.82], d ¼ .21,
95% CI [0.05, 0.37], but not of near transgressions, b ¼ .18,
SE ¼ 0.17, t(602) ¼ 1.08, p = .28, 95% CI [0.15, 0.52],
d ¼ .09, 95% CI [0.07, 0.25].
From a different vantage point, there was no distance effect
on purity-related moral judgment in the control condition, b ¼
.21, SE ¼ 0.17, t(602) ¼ 1.21, p ¼ .23, 95% CI [0.54,
0.13], d ¼ .10, 95% CI [0.26, 0.06] or disgust condition
(b ¼ .07, SE ¼ 0.18, t(602) ¼ .39, p ¼ .69, 95% CI [0.29,
0.43], d ¼ .03, 95% CI [0.13, 0.19]).
We then tested if distance influences other (vs. self) focus
(Figure 1). OLS regression revealed that high (vs. low) distance
strengthened other (vs. self) focus for purity transgressions, b¼
13.23, SE ¼ 2.20, t(602) ¼ 6.02, p < .001, 95% CI [8.91,
17.54], d ¼ .49, 95% CI [0.33, 0.65], and nonpurity transgres-
sions, b ¼ 10.94, SE ¼ 1.50, t(602) ¼ 7.13, p < .001, 95% CI
[7.75, 13.64], d ¼ .58, 95% CI [0.42, 0.74].
We subsequently tested if other (vs. self) focus moderates
the effect of disgust on moral judgment (Table 8, Model 2).
Disgust  Self versus other focus marginally affected purity-
related but not nonpurity-related moral judgment.
Johnson-Neyman analyses revealed that disgust (vs. control)
led to more severe purity-related moral judgment (p < .05) only
for self versus other focus values >52.36 (see Figure 7).
Self versus other focus predicted purity-related moral judg-
ment in the control condition (b¼.008, SE¼ 0.003, t(602)¼
2.67, p = .01, 95% CI [0.015, 0.002], d ¼ .22, 95% CI
[0.38,0.06]) but not in de disgust condition (b¼.002, SE
¼ 0.003, t(602) ¼ .07, p = .95, 95% CI [0.007, 0.006], d ¼
.01, 95% CI [0.15, 0.17]).
As an overall test that other versus self focus mediates psy-
chological distance’s moderating role in the effect of disgust on
purity-related moral judgment (Figure 1), we fitted the full
model with Lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) to calculate a bootstrapped
(5,000 resamples) CI of the index of moderated mediation
(index ¼ .06, 95% CI [0.001, 0.166]; d ¼ 0.12, 95% CI
[0.04, 0.28]; Hayes, 2013).
Quantitative Integration of Studies
Overall, Studies 1–4 indicate that disgust influences moral judg-
ment of distant (vs. near) violations. However, this effect was not
significant in all studies. Given that true effects are unlikely to be
statistically significant in each study that tests them, this is not
surprising (Lakens & Etz, 2017). Furthermore, distance appears
to more strongly moderate the relationship between disgust sen-
sitivity and nonpurity- than purity-related moral judgment (Stud-
ies 1 and 3). However, distance appears to more strongly
moderate the effect of incidental disgust on purity rather than
nonpurity-related moral judgment (Study 2). To assess which
effects consistently emerge across our studies, we conducted
within-paper meta-analyses using meta-essentials (van Rhee,
Suurmond, & Hak, 2015) with random effect models and
weighting the study effect sizes by the inverse variance (Lipsey
& Wilson, 2001). Table 9 presents the results.
Across Studies 1–4, we found a robust Disgust  Psycholo-
gical Distance interaction on purity- and nonpurity-related
moral judgment. Distance does not significantly more strongly
moderate the relationship between disgust sensitivity and non-
purity- than purity-related judgment (Studies 1 and 3). Distance
also does not significantly more strongly moderate the effect of
incidental disgust on purity- than nonpurity-related judgment
(Studies 2 and 4).
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Study 3).
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5
1 Disgust
sensitivity
3.18 0.65 (.89) .22*** .46*** .44*** .34***
2 Dispositional
anger
2.34 0.79 (.88) .43*** .04 .09*
3 Dispositional
fear
2.88 0.74 (.90) .24*** .18***
4 Purity-related
moral
judgment
3.92 1.46 (.89) .65***
5 Nonpurity
related
moral
judgment
4.29 0.94 (.89)
Note. N ¼ 612. The diagonal lists a coefficients.
*p < .05. ***p < .001.
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General Discussion
High (vs. low) disgust sensitivity predicts (Studies 1 and 3) and
incidental disgust (vs. a control condition) causes (Studies 2
and 4) more severe moral judgment of violations that are
psychologically distant (vs. near). Psychological distance mod-
erates the effect of disgust sensitivity on moral judgment spe-
cifically and not effects of trait anger and fear (Studies 1 and
3). The moderating role of psychological distance results
because conceptualizations of distant (vs. near) violations are
Table 6. Regression Results of Study 3.
Purity-Related Moral Judgment Nonpurity Related Moral Judgment
Step 1 R2 ¼ .20*** Step 1 R2 ¼ .13***
b (SE) [95% CI b] t d [95% CI d] b (SE) [95% CI b] t d [95% CI d]
Constant 3.92 (.05) [3.81, 4.02] 73.79*** 5.97 [5.60, 6.34] 4.29 (.04) [4.22, 4.36] 120.20*** 9.72 [9.15, 10.29
Disgust 1.00 (.08) [0.83, 1.16] 12.13*** 0.98 [0.81, 1.15] 0.49 (.06) [0.39, 0.60] 8.95*** 0.72 [0.56, 0.89]
Distance 0.07 (.05) [0.17, 0.04] 1.27 0.10 [0.26, 0.06] 0.04 (.04) [0.11, 0.03] 1.10 0.09 [0.25, 0.07]
Disgust 
Distance
0.10 (.08) [0.06, 0.26] 1.19 0.10 [0.06, 0.25] 0.14 (.06) [0.04, 0.25] 2.60** 0.21 [0.05, 0.37]
Step 2 R2change ¼ .01y Step 2 R2change ¼ .04**
Constant 3.92 (.05) [3.82, 4.03] 74.02*** 5.98 [5.61, 6.34] 4.30 (.04) [4.23, 4.36] 122.83*** 9.93 [9.35, 10.51]
Disgust 0.97 (.09) [0.78, 1.15] 10.45*** 0.84 [0.68, 1.01] 0.49 (.06) [0.37, 0.61] 8.10*** 0.65 [0.49, 0.82]
Distance 0.07 (.05) [0.17, 0.04] 1.24 0.10 [0.26, 0.06] 0.03 (.04) [0.10, 0.04] .96 0.08 [0.24, 0.08]
Disgust 
Distance
0.16 (.09) [0.02, 0.34] 1.71y 0.14 [0.02, 0.30] 0.21 (.06) [0.09, 0.33] 3.38*** 0.27 [0.11, 0.43]
Anger 0.16 (.08) [0.30, 0.01] 2.09* 0.17 [0.33, 0.01] 0.25 (.05) [0.35, 0.16] 5.14*** 0.42 [0.58, 0.26]
Fear 0.15 (.09) [0.03, 0.32] 1.64 0.13 [0.03, 0.29] 0.14 (.06) [0.02, 0.25] 2.38* 0.19 [0.03, 0.35]
Anger 
Distance
0.07 (.08) [0.22, 0.07] 0.99 0.08 [0.24, 0.08] 0.05 (.05) [0.15, 0.05] 1.00 0.08 [0.24, 0.08]
Fear 
Distance
0.08 (.09) [0.25, 0.10] 0.89 0.07 [0.23, 0.09] 0.09 (.06) [0.20, 0.03] 1.52 0.12 [0.28, 0.04]
Note. Interactions are based on mean centered versions of disgust, anger, and fear and an effect coded version of distance (1¼ near, 1¼ distant). Table presents
unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors (in round brackets), 95% confidence intervals (CIs; in square brackets), t values, Cohen’s d coefficients, and
95% CIs (in square brackets).
yp < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Figure 5. How disgust sensitivity predicts moral judgment in Study 3.
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more likely to involve others (vs. the self; Studies 2 and 4).
Across the studies, the role of psychological distance does not
vary significantly for disgust sensitivity versus incidental dis-
gust or for purity- versus nonpurity-related moral judgment.
Evaluations of distal transgressions can have important con-
sequences. For instance, people often decide whether or not to
support authorities they may never meet (e.g., voting for poli-
ticians). Such decisions have moral connotations (Mayer,
David, & Schoorman, 1995). This makes them prone to be
affected by disgust, which can be aroused by various inconse-
quential factors (e.g., facial attractiveness; Krendl, Macrae,
Kelley, Fugelsang, & Heatherton, 2006).
Prior work studying effects of psychological distance on
moral judgment found inconsistent effects. Some studies found
more severe moral judgment of near (vs. distant) transgressions,
including purity-related transgressions (Study 5; Gong & Medin,
2012); others found opposite effects of distance (Study 2; Eyal,
Liberman, &Trope, 2008; Zˇezˇelj & Jokic´, 2014) or no effect
(Studies 1 and 3; Zˇezˇelj & Jokic´, 2014). Our Study 1 shows that
high (vs. low) distance makes moral judgment more severe
among individuals low in disgust sensitivity but less severe
among individuals high in disgust sensitivity. Disgust sensitivity
varies reliably between individuals and collectives, for instance,
between sexes (Oaten et al., 2009) and political orientation
(Inbar et al., 2009). Conflicting prior findings may thus partly
reflect differences in disgust sensitivity among study samples.
Studies 2 and 4 showed that violations in which others (vs.
the self) are involved resulted in less severe purity-related judg-
ment in the control condition, but no effect of other (vs. self)
involvement was observed in the disgust condition. This results
from (nonsignificant or marginal) main effects of other (vs.
self) involvement on purity-related judgment: Violations are
judged more severely when they involve the self. This is in line
with much research and theory (Lind, Kray, & Thompson,
1998), and distance having a main effect does not undermine
our conclusions about distance as moderating disgust and the
mediating role of other (vs. self) orientation in this process.
To conclude, although disgust is an avoidance-oriented emo-
tion, it affects moral judgment of distant rather than near events.
These findings integrate suggestions that disgust pertains specif-
ically to unknown threats (e.g., pathogens for which one lacks
immunity) with theory on how affect influences human judgment.
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Study 4).
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4
1 Other versus self
(purity)
59.52 27.66 .42*** .08* .07y
2 Other versus self
(nonpurity)
41.98 19.11 .07y .08*
3 Purity-related moral
judgment
7.66 1.53 (.52) .34***
4 Nonpurity related
moral judgment
6.35 1.69 (.48)
Note. N ¼ 634. The diagonal lists a coefficients.
yp < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Figure 6. The effect of incidental disgust on moral judgment as moderated by psychological distance (Study 4). Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
Figure 7. Regions of significance plots of the effect of disgust on moral judgment as moderated by other versus self focus in Study 4. Grey zones
represent 95% confidence intervals for the effect of disgust as a function of other versus self focus.
Table 9. Meta Analytic Integration of Studies.
All Studies Studies 1 and 3 Studies 2 and 4
Purity-related judgment .14 [.04, .24] .14 [.001, .281] .14 [.004, .276]
Nonpurity related judgment .18 [.08, .28] .26 [.12, .40] .10 [.04, .24]
Nonpurity—purity-related judgment difference .0004 [.10, .10] .06 [.08, .20] .06 [.20, .08]
Note. Table presents Cohen’s d and 95% confidence intervals (within square brackets).
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Notes
1. Two participants did not respond to the disgust manipulation
check; six did not respond to the distance check.
2. We pretested Studies 3 and 4 in a sample of trusted respondents
(N ¼ 23) who learned: “In order for your responses to be useable,
it is necessary that you work at an appropriate speed. This means
that you don’t rush through the survey but also don’t take too much
time to think through everything in great detail. Just work at a
steady, realistic pace.” The fastest respondent spents 320 s on the
study. Therefore, we excluded participants from Studies 3–4 who
spent less than 320 s on the study.
3. One person did not respond to this check.
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